Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency
zbMATH Open document ID: 0841.90021
DOI: 10.1007/BF01307826
author: Richard M. Cyert
author: Praveen Kumar
published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory
publication date: 1996-07-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B70
zbMATH DE Number: 849097
zbMATH Keywords: organizational structure
zbMATH Keywords: agency
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic price competition in oligopoly
zbMATH Keywords: business cycle
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 849097