Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0849.90134
author: Thomas A. Gresik
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1996-07-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 896384
zbMATH Keywords: two-party bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: sealed-bid mechanism
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1996.0002
OpenAlex ID: W1966044696
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1996.0002
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 896384