On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
zbMATH Open document ID: 0849.90043
author: Erik J. Balder
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1996-09-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/2582
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 896389
zbMATH Keywords: existence of optimal contract selection mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent models
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2106483680
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1996.0007
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 896389