Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0852.90144
DOI: 10.1007/BF00134211
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1996-07-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 907971
zbMATH Keywords: language
zbMATH Keywords: focal point
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated \(N\)-player coordination games
zbMATH Keywords: strategic uncertainty
author: Francis Kramarz
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3331506
cites work: Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
cites work: Stable equilibria and forward induction
cites work: Dynamic coordination games
cites work: Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
cites work: On the complexity of designing distributed protocols
cites work: Intractable Problems in Control Theory
cites work: Self enforceable paths in extensive form games
cites work: Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
cites work: On the complexity of decentralized decision making and detection problems
cites work: Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
cites work: The Evolution of Conventions
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 907971