Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 0852.90009
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213907
author: Oscar Volij
author: Gertjan D. Otten
author: Hans Peters
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1996-08-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 913880
zbMATH Keywords: uniform rule
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions
zbMATH Keywords: independence of irrelevant alternatives
zbMATH Keywords: restricted monotonicity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 913880