Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
zbMATH Open document ID: 0855.90043
DOI: 10.1007/BF01258621
author: Erwin Amann
author: Wolfgang Leininger
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 1996-10-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 934273
zbMATH Keywords: linkage principle
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay sealed-bid auction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Q3712069
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 934273