Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 1253.91085
author: Yongsheng Xu
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2012-12-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6116643
zbMATH Keywords: convex bargaining problems
zbMATH Keywords: symmetry-based compromise
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: scale invariance
zbMATH Keywords: Nash solution
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2011.12.109
OpenAlex ID: W2002796936
cites work: Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points
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cites work: Stability and the Nash solution
cites work: Q3252269
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cites work: Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining
cites work: Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.109
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6116643