On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 1253.91024
author: Hans Carlsson
author: Philipp C. Wichardt
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2012-12-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6116649
zbMATH Keywords: beliefs
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: existence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2011.12.129
OpenAlex ID: W3125153134
cites work: Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
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cites work: Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
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cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.129
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6116649