Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1280.91126
author: Itai Ashlagi
author: Flip Klijn
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2012-12-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6119079
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-011-0549-y
OpenAlex ID: W2139822873
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-011-0549-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6119079