Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
zbMATH Open document ID: 1253.91033
author: Jens Leth Hougaard
author: Mich Tvede
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2012-12-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6119535
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: minimum cost spanning tree
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: truth-telling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2012.05.023
OpenAlex ID: W2002579407
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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2012.05.023
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6119535