Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry
zbMATH Open document ID: 1254.91242
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00326-9
author: Domenico Menicucci
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6120033
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auction design
zbMATH Keywords: risk aversion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6120033