Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1254.91528
author: Konstantinos Serfes
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
zbMATH DE Number: 6120975
zbMATH Keywords: risk sharing
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous matching
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2005.02.020
OpenAlex ID: W1992541797
cites work: Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
cites work: Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds
cites work: Assortative Matching and Search
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.02.020
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6120975