Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1254.91548
author: Francisco Candel-Sánchez
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 6121845
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: threshold effects
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2005.07.004
OpenAlex ID: W2038287411
cites work: On the dynamics of the regulation of pollution: Incentive compatible regulation of a persistent pollutant
cites work: Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
cites work: To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.07.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6121845