First-price auctions without affiliation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: First-price auctions without affiliation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1254.91244
author: Paulo Monteiro
author: Humberto Moreira
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6122300
zbMATH Keywords: first-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: affiliation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2005.08.006
OpenAlex ID: W2092499860
cites work: Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
cites work: Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: First price auctions: monotonicity and uniqueness
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.08.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6122300