Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91172
author: Andrea Attar
author: Eloisa Campioni
author: Gwenaël Piaser
author: Uday Rajan
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2013-01-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6122381
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: multiple-principal multiple-agent
zbMATH Keywords: simple mechanisms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-012-0116-8
OpenAlex ID: W1971827718
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-012-0116-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6122381