The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1254.91224
author: John K. Horowitz
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
zbMATH DE Number: 6123429
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: valuation
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auction
zbMATH Keywords: willingness-to-pay
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2006.03.033
OpenAlex ID: W2001675639
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.03.033
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6123429