Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91205
author: Levon Goukasian
author: Xuhu Wan
published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics
publication date: 2013-01-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6127185
zbMATH Keywords: multi-agent problems
zbMATH Keywords: hidden action
zbMATH Keywords: envy
zbMATH Keywords: jealousy
zbMATH Keywords: behavioral contract theory
zbMATH Keywords: optimal effort
zbMATH Keywords: pay-for-performance sensitivity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11579-010-0035-9
OpenAlex ID: W2097307635
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DOI: 10.1007/S11579-010-0035-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6127185