Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: non-commitment as a strategic tool
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: non-commitment as a strategic tool
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91164
author: David McAdams
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6131140
zbMATH Keywords: uniform-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: adjustable supply
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2006.08.035
OpenAlex ID: W2031304206
cites work: Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
cites work: Erratum to ``The uniform price auction with endogenous supply''
cites work: The multiple unit auction with variable supply
cites work: Auctions of Shares
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.08.035
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6131140