Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91039
author: Kjell Hausken
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-28T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184331
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6131292
zbMATH Keywords: conflict
zbMATH Keywords: risk limits
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: discounting
zbMATH Keywords: reputation
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1973954512
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.02.033
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6131292