Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91142
author: Prabal Roy Chowdhury
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6132269
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: ceilings
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: reserve prices
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2007.04.033
OpenAlex ID: W1749064618
cites work: Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
cites work: Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.04.033
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6132269