Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91165
author: József Molnár
author: Gábor Virág
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6132378
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: information disclosure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2007.08.010
OpenAlex ID: W2030264255
cites work: Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
cites work: Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.08.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6132378