Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91068
author: Marc Vorsatz
author: M. Walzl
author: Ronald Peeters
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6132604
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: rewards
zbMATH Keywords: strategic information transmission
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2008.07.016
OpenAlex ID: W1999229483
cites work: Truth or Consequences: An Experiment
cites work: Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation
cites work: A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
cites work: An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.07.016
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6132604