Private versus complete information in auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Private versus complete information in auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91166
author: Florian Morath
author: Johannes Münster
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6132622
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auctions
zbMATH Keywords: war of attrition
zbMATH Keywords: revenue equivalence
zbMATH Keywords: information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2008.08.005
OpenAlex ID: W2014293903
cites work: (All) equilibria in a class of bidding games
cites work: Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
cites work: The all-pay auction with complete information
cites work: All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
cites work: Multidimensional private value auctions
cites work: Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
cites work: An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
cites work: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Information in conflicts.
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.08.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6132622