Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
zbMATH Open document ID: 1255.91227
author: Patrick W. Schmitz
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6132638
zbMATH Keywords: information gathering
zbMATH Keywords: hold-up problem
zbMATH Keywords: complete contracting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2008.08.026
OpenAlex ID: W3122286895
cites work: Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
cites work: Contracts and productive information gathering
cites work: After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
cites work: Implementation and Renegotiation
cites work: Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
cites work: Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
cites work: On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
cites work: Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.08.026
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6132638