The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1267.91039
author: Oriol Tejada
author: Marina Núñez
published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
publication date: 2013-02-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/48609
review text: The authors consider a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market. They show that both the nucleolus and the core center of this market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core center of the associated sectors game. These results simplify the computation for the large number of agents. An example of computations is given.
reviewed by: Krzysztof Piasecki
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-08
zbMATH DE Number: 6137594
zbMATH Keywords: multi-sided assignment games
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: nucleolus
zbMATH Keywords: core-center
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2152057133
cites work: The kernel of a cooperative game
cites work: Q5565773
cites work: A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center
cites work: Q3916403
cites work: Cores of partitioning games
cites work: Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
cites work: A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game
cites work: The Böhm-Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis
cites work: The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
cites work: The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
cites work: Cores of convex games
cites work: The assignment game. I: The core
cites work: Multisided matching games with complementarities
cites work: An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
cites work: Assignment games with stable core
cites work: The supplier-firm-buyer game and its \(m\)-sided generalization
cites work: Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
DOI: 10.1007/S00186-012-0381-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6137594