Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
zbMATH Open document ID: 1274.91046
author: Peter H. Knudsen
author: Lars Peter Østerdal
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2013-02-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 0519.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6138644
zbMATH Keywords: manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: merging
zbMATH Keywords: splitting
zbMATH Keywords: Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2013562363
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-012-0337-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6138644