Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1275.91088
author: Agostino Capponi
author: Jakša Cvitanić
author: Türkay Yolcu
published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics
publication date: 2013-02-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6139048
zbMATH Keywords: optimal contracts
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent problem
zbMATH Keywords: variational calculus
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic filtering
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
describes a project that uses: Sbvp
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11579-012-0088-z
OpenAlex ID: W2069985124
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DOI: 10.1007/S11579-012-0088-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6139048