Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91045
author: Markus Kinateder
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2013-03-04T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1261063683 WP UNAV 18 09.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6141020
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: delayed perfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1977408311
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
cites work: Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
cites work: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
cites work: Social Norms and Community Enforcement
cites work: Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
cites work: Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-012-0349-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6141020