Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91060
author: Péter Eső
author: Ádám Galambos
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2013-03-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6141022
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: hard evidence
zbMATH Keywords: information transmission
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-012-0344-8
OpenAlex ID: W2100951350
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-012-0344-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6141022