An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91233
author: Thayer Morrill
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2013-03-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6141023
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: stable allocations
zbMATH Keywords: axioms
zbMATH Keywords: mutual best
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-011-0311-9
OpenAlex ID: W2095165028
Wikidata QID: Q57428130
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-011-0311-9
DBLP publication ID: journals/ijgt/Morrill13
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6141023