First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91142
author: Gábor Virág
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-03-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 17094.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6148614
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: resale
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic market interaction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2157448422
cites work: Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
cites work: Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
cites work: First price auctions with resale
cites work: Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
cites work: Manipulative auction design
cites work: Asymmetric Auctions
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
cites work: Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
cites work: Optimal Auction with Resale
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-011-0666-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6148614