Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91140
author: Leonid Polishchuk
author: Alexander Tonis
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-03-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6148620
zbMATH Keywords: rent seeking
zbMATH Keywords: contest success functions
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-011-0622-x
OpenAlex ID: W2096973185
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-011-0622-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6148620