Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91123
author: Juan Carlos Carbajal
author: Jeffrey C. Ely
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-03-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 6146977
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: revenue equivalence
zbMATH Keywords: integral monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: revenue maximization
zbMATH Keywords: loss aversion
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: non-contractible actions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2012.12.014
OpenAlex ID: W2088546345
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.12.014
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6146977