A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
zbMATH Open document ID: 1282.91097
author: Shin Sato
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-03-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6146982
zbMATH Keywords: adjacent manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: AM-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2012.12.001
OpenAlex ID: W2067509296
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.12.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6146982