An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
zbMATH Open document ID: 1260.91114
author: Toyotaka Sakai
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2013-03-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6149112
zbMATH Keywords: non-quasilinear preference
zbMATH Keywords: second price auction
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: equal treatment of equals
zbMATH Keywords: fair allocation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-012-0135-5
OpenAlex ID: W1965583710
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-012-0135-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6149112