Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
zbMATH Open document ID: 1333.91004
author: Christian Kanzow
author: Wolfgang Leininger
author: Alexandra Schwartz
author: Jörg Franke
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-05-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6160837
zbMATH Keywords: contest theory
zbMATH Keywords: contest design
zbMATH Keywords: level playing field
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-011-0657-z
OpenAlex ID: W1979137999
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-011-0657-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6160837