A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1262.68044
author: Elias Koutsoupias
author: Angelina Vidali
published in: Algorithmica
publication date: 2013-05-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68M20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6163660
zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic game theory
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: scheduling unrelated machines
zbMATH Keywords: truthful
zbMATH Keywords: lower bound
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategies
zbMATH Keywords: multiparameter mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00453-012-9634-6
OpenAlex ID: W1602132852
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DOI: 10.1007/S00453-012-9634-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6163660