Ideology and endogenous constitutions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ideology and endogenous constitutions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91059
author: Alessandro Riboni
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2013-05-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7723
review text: From the text: The raison d'être of this paper is mathematical justification of legislative decision making with position-taking preference. Reviewing a lot of the literature in this area the author presents his own model. A three-person legislature \(N = \{l,c,r\}\) has to select a one-dimensional policy \(x\) in the continuous interval \(X\subset\mathbb R\). The indexes \(l\), \(c\), and \(r\) stand for the legislator who represents the left-, center-, and right-leaning constituency, respectively. \(x\) is decided after playing an agenda-setting game under closed rule. Let \(q\in X\) denote the status quo alternative. Concerning preferences, it is assumed that legislators have a double objective. In particular, the utility of each policy maker \(i\in N\) is given by \[ u_i(p_i,x)=-\frac{1}{2}|x|-\theta_i|p_i-i|. \tag{1} \] The first term in (1) depends on \(x\), the policy that is implemented in the economy. The second term is less standard and reflects electoral considerations on the part of legislators. More specifically, it depends on the position \(p_i\), taken by legislator \(i\) in the voting game, where \(p_i\) also takes values in \(X\). In order to maximize the second term, \(p_i\) should be set equal to \(i\). Note that the index \(i\) denotes the legislator but also the policy that minimizes the legislator's position cost. To streamline the analysis, it is assumed that \(c=0\) and that \(l\) and \(r\) are symmetrically on opposite sides of zero. That is, \[ l<0<r \quad \text{ and} \quad r=-l. \tag{2} \] Moreover, in order to make the model as transparent as possible, it is also assumed that the first term in (1) is the same for all legislators, that is, all legislators agree that the correct policy decision for the economy at large is \(x = 0\). Then, disagreement among legislators arises because of electoral considerations. Throughout this paper, the author often refers to \(l\) and \(r\) as the ideological legislators. Knowing the values of \(r\) and …
reviewed by: Fatima T. Adylova
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6162240
zbMATH Keywords: majority rule
zbMATH Keywords: position-taking preferences
zbMATH Keywords: ideological polarization
zbMATH Keywords: strategic interactions
zbMATH Keywords: agenda-setting game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1990765258
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-011-0668-9
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6162240