Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1244.91034
author: Dolors Berga
author: Bernardo Moreno
author: Salvador Barberà
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-09-30T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5793906
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: group strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: sequential inclusion
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: separable preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2151470090
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5793906