Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1245.91068
author: John William Hatfield
author: Fuhito Kojima
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-09-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5793908
zbMATH Keywords: substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: unilateral substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: matching with contracts
zbMATH Keywords: law of aggregate demand
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: rural hospitals theorem
zbMATH Keywords: group strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: lattice
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2010.01.007
OpenAlex ID: W2161153180
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.01.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5793908