A dynamic theory of war and peace
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A dynamic theory of war and peace
zbMATH Open document ID: 1244.91058
author: Pierre Yared
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2010-09-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F99
zbMATH DE Number: 5793917
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric and private information
zbMATH Keywords: contract theory
zbMATH Keywords: international political economy
zbMATH Keywords: war
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2010.04.005
OpenAlex ID: W3125987214
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2010.04.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5793917