The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1232.91191
author: S. Courtin
author: Boniface Mbih
author: Issofa Moyouwou
author: Thomas Senné
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2010-10-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5797127
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-010-0449-6
OpenAlex ID: W2092928642
Wikidata QID: Q114018209
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0449-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5797127