Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1205.68257
author: Péter Biró
author: Eric J. McDermid
published in: Algorithmica
publication date: 2010-10-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68R10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68R05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5797150
zbMATH Keywords: stable marriage problem
zbMATH Keywords: three-dimensional matching
zbMATH Keywords: cyclic preferences
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
zbMATH Keywords: Kidney exchange
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00453-009-9315-2
OpenAlex ID: W1992351112
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DOI: 10.1007/S00453-009-9315-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5797150