Auction design with a risk averse seller
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Auction design with a risk averse seller
zbMATH Open document ID: 1005.91051
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00115-9
author: Péter Eső
author: Gábor Futó
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2000-01-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
zbMATH DE Number: 1387562
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: risk aversion
zbMATH Keywords: insurance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
cites work: Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
cites work: Game theory
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
full work available at URL: s0165-1765(99)00115-9
OpenAlex ID: W2054347841
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1387562