Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
zbMATH Open document ID: 0955.91014
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00061-5
author: H. Reiju Mihara
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2001-03-04T00:00:00Z
review text: In the classical proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem, the assumption that the set of individuals is finite plays a central role. Furthermore, it was shown that this assumption is not only crucial to make the proof simpler, but also that it is a necessary part of the theorem itself: for infinite societies, there exists a social welfare function satisfying other Arrow's conditions. Several authors gave nonconstructive proofs of this existence. In this paper, the author gives a concrete example of such a social welfare function and shows how to compute, given two alternatives, which alternative is socially preferred under this function.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1394845
zbMATH Keywords: recursion theory
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: social welfare function
Wikidata QID: Q55899881
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0304-4068(98)00061-5
OpenAlex ID: W2128900841
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1394845