Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 0940.91045
author: Eddie Dekel
author: Drew Fudenberg
author: David K. Levine
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-03-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200614
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
zbMATH DE Number: 1417921
zbMATH Keywords: self-confirming equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium path
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic model
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2125293595
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2576
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1417921