Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
zbMATH Open document ID: 0941.91506
author: E. Elisabet Rutström
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2000-04-18T00:00:00Z
review text: The behavioral properties of several auctions designed to elicit individual valuations for an object are studied using controlled laboratory experiments. Our experiments lead us to conclude that there are some behavioral differences between alternative incentive-compatible institutions for eliciting home-grown values, contrary to the theoretical expectation that these institutions are isomorphic. These results are consistent with earlier experimental results using induced values. The most important finding is that English auctions appear to elicit lower bids than Vickrey auctions, after controlling for observable socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, English auction bids also exhibit significantly less residual variance and may be sensitive to the number of rival bidders. It appears that the real-time learning allowed in the English auction significantly affects subject behavior. We also find that values elicited with the Becker, DeGroot and Marshak institution differ from those in both English and Vickrey auctions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 1433486
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: English auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auctions
zbMATH Keywords: value elicitation
zbMATH Keywords: experiments
describes a project that uses: LIMDEP
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001820050082
OpenAlex ID: W2127683434
DOI: 10.1007/S001820050082
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1433486