On implementation via demand commitment games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On implementation via demand commitment games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0982.91007
author: Ani Dasgupta
author: Y. Stephen Chiu
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2000-04-11T00:00:00Z
review text: A noncooperative game called the Simple Demand Commitment Game (SDCG for short) is studied. It is shown that SDCG implements the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any \(n\)-person characteristic function game. This result is an improvement relative to other proposed models. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy which generates the Shapley value outcomes is also given. As shown for 3-person games, an SDCG can implement the core if the game, convex or not, has a core with a nonempty interior.
reviewed by: Anna Gomolińska
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1429808
zbMATH Keywords: demand commitment game
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: convex game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001820050064
OpenAlex ID: W2075860708
DOI: 10.1007/S001820050064
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1429808