On consistent solutions for strategic games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On consistent solutions for strategic games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0966.91003
author: Fioravante Patrone
author: G. Pieri
author: Stef Tijs
author: Anna Torre
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2000-04-11T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors introduce the class of ``personalized'' Nash equilibria (\textbf{P}-NE) which provides a unified approach for various kind of approximate Nash equilibria solutions. This is done by introducing a personalized choice rule \(p\) for all the potential players and substituting a conveniently defined characterizations for one person rationality (OPR) by (\textbf{P}-OPR). It is also proved that (\textbf{P}-NE) contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency. See also the article by \textit{B. Peleg, J. Potters}, and \textit{S. Tijs} [Econ. Theory 7, 81--93 (1996; Zbl 0840.90138)].
reviewed by: Samir Kumar Neogy
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1429810
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: strategic games
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatization
zbMATH Keywords: consistency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2168203663
DOI: 10.1007/S001820050065
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1429810