Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
zbMATH Open document ID: 0962.91013
author: Andrew Schotter
author: Wei Zheng
author: Blaine Snyder
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2000-04-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1437107
zbMATH Keywords: delegation games
zbMATH Keywords: commitment games
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: agents
zbMATH Keywords: preference distortion games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2160523509
cites work: Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining
cites work: Strategic delegation in bargaining
cites work: Bargaining under Incomplete Information
cites work: A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
cites work: Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
cites work: Unobserved Delegation
cites work: Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
cites work: Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
cites work: The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
cites work: The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
cites work: Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: Q3206104
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0728
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1437107